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I am pleased to present these reply comments in the Commission’s Open Internet 
proceeding.  I am an assistant professor of law at Boston College Law School, where I 
teach and write in the fields of telecommunications, administrative law, and property.  
This submission replies to comments submitted by AT&T, Comcast Corporation, 
Verizon, and others suggesting that the Commission’s proposed regulations would effect 
a taking of private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment.  These reply comments are a condensed version of an article that will 
appear in the Notre Dame Law Review later this year.  A draft of that article is available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1577082. 
INTRODUCTION 
When the D.C. Circuit recently rejected the Commission’s claimed authority to 
enforce nondiscrimination norms against Comcast Corporation,1 it placed this proceeding 
in legal limbo.  To assert jurisdiction over broadband networks, the Open Internet NPRM 
                                                 
1 See Comcast Corporation v. FCC, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 1286658 (D.C. Cir., April 6, 2010). 
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relies primarily upon an expansive view of the Commission’s Title I authority, citing 
directly to arguments made in the Comcast Order that the D.C. Circuit rejected on appeal.  
The Commission should heed the court’s warning and either refrain from regulating 
network management practices entirely, or at least seek explicit congressional authority 
before doing so.  Without doubt this would be the wiser course: explicit statutory 
authority would assuage the court’s concern that the Commission “act only pursuant to 
authority delegated to [it] by Congress,”2 in a way that reclassification of broadband 
services under Title II (or finding a new jurisdictional hook under Title I) would not.  
While commenters will offer many reasons why the Commission should refuse to 
regulate broadband providers without explicit congressional authority, this reply 
comment highlights one in particular: the likelihood that the proposed regulations violate 
the Fifth Amendment. 
Under the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence, the Commission’s 
proposed rules effect a permanent physical occupation of private broadband networks and 
therefore take broadband network providers’ property without just compensation.  In 
essence, net neutrality would grant content and application providers a permanent virtual 
easement across privately-owned broadband networks.  It thus would deprive broadband 
providers of the right to exclude others from their networks—a right that the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly dubbed “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that 
are commonly characterized as property.”3  At the very least, the Takings Clause issue 
raises a serious constitutional question regarding the Commission’s authority to adopt net 
neutrality regulations without clear authority from Congress to do so.  To avoid this 
                                                 
2 Id. (quoting American Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 691 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
3 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)). 
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problem, Commission should seek explicit Congressional approval to promulgate net 
neutrality rules, rather than continue to freelance at the periphery of its regulatory 
authority. 
I. THE OPEN INTERNET NPRM THROUGH THE LENS OF THE 
TAKINGS CLAUSE 
Over 85 years ago, the Court recognized that a regulation that goes “too far” can 
constitute a taking for which just compensation is owed, even if the owner retains title 
and even some use rights in its property.4  These “regulatory takings” are usually 
governed by the three-part Penn Central5 test, under which the court balances (1) the 
economic impact of the regulation and (2) its interference with the owner’s reasonable 
investment-backed expectations against (3) the nature of the government’s action.6  But 
in Loretto,7 the Court created a narrow exception to the Penn Central test for regulations 
that constitute permanent physical occupations of property, either by the government or 
by third parties.  Justice Marshall, not generally known as a proponent of either bright-
line rules or strong property rights, wrote for the majority that “[s]uch an appropriation is 
perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests” and therefore 
constitutes “a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.”8 
To fit the Loretto rule, a regulation must go beyond mere “restrictions upon the 
owner’s use of his property.”9  Rather, as one article notes, “[t]he operative fact in such 
cases is that the government is appropriating the use of the property for the benefit of the 
                                                 
4 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
5 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
6 Id. at 124. 
7 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).   
8 Id. at 426, 435. 
9 Id. at 441 (emphasis added). 
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public.”10  Loretto involved a regulation requiring landlords to allow cable companies to 
install equipment on their properties to provide service to tenants, without charging more 
than a nominal fee for access.11  The Court found the regulation constituted a taking 
because it effected a permanent physical occupation of the landlord’s property: it limited 
the owner’s right to exclude, and granted a third party a permanent right to use a portion 
of the owner’s property.  The Court later explained that the line separating a typical 
regulation from a Loretto taking is “unambiguous distinction between a commercial 
lessee and an interloper with a government license.12  When a regulation grants 
permanent access rights to a third-party over the owner’s objection, a taking has occurred 
and compensation must be paid. 
The Commission’s proposed restrictions violate Loretto by converting third-party 
content and application providers from “commercial licensees” to “interlopers with a 
government license.”  In essence, these third parties receive an unlimited, continuous 
right of access to broadband providers’ private property.  This access allows them to 
physically invade broadband networks with their electronic signals and permanently 
occupy portions of network capacity, all without having to pay the network provider for 
access.  The effect is to appropriate the use of these private networks for the public’s 
benefit, in the form of unfettered and nondiscriminatory access to the content and 
applications of the consumer’s choosing.   
To draw a parallel to real  property law, content and a pplication providers receive 
the equivalent of a virtual easement to traverse broadband providers’ networks.  In Nollan 
                                                 
10 William P. Barr, Henry Weissmann, and John P. Frantz, The Gild That is Killing the Lily: How 
Confusion Over Regulatory Takings Doctrine is Undermining the Core Protections of the Takings Clause, 
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 485 (2005) (emphasis added). 
11Loretto, 458 U.S. at 421. 
12 F.C.C. v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1987). 
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v. California Coastal Commission, 13 the Court explained th at the imposition of  an 
easement across a privately-held beach would unquestionably constitute a Loretto taking, 
even though it meant that different members of the public might occupy different parts of 
the property at any given tim e. “‘[P]ermanent physical occupation’ has occurred, for  
purposes of that rule, where individuals ar e given a perm anent and continuous right to 
pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no 
particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises.”14 
Moreover, as in Loretto, the net neu trality rules are not m ere restrictions on an 
owner’s ability to use its property.  Rather, the proposed rules “chops through the bundle” 
of property rights, “taki ng a slice of every strand.” 15  Most obviously, broadband 
providers lose the right to exclude, which “has traditionally been considered one of the 
most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.” 16  Indeed, the very 
purpose of net neutrality is to  deny broadband providers the right to exclude others fro m 
their networks.  Broadband providers al so lose the ability  to control the use of their 
networks: they can neither use for their own purposes bandwidth that has been already 
occupied by a third party, nor m ay they send their own signals th rough their network if 
doing so will disproportionately “degrade” third party content (for example, by adversely 
rerouting third-party da ta packets in a way that would cause delays or packet loss).  
Finally, net neutrality infringes on the right to dispose.  The prohibition against charging 
for preferred network access lim its network provide rs’ ability to “lease ” scarce 
broadband for a profit, and also lim its the va lue of the network to prospective buyers 
                                                 
13 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
14 Id. at 831.   
15 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435. 
16 Id. 
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insofar as they are unable to us e for thei r own purposes that portion of the network 
occupied by third-party content.17 
Nor does it m atter that the benef iciaries receive a righ t to access electron ic 
networks rather than to real property.  Loretto has never been lim ited to physical 
occupation of real property.18  Indeed, Justice Blackm un’s dissent notes that the 
majority’s opinion, when “[l]iterally read,” must include compelled access to electronic 
networks:  “[s]o long as Teleprom pter continuously passed its elec tronic signal through 
the cable…a ‘physical touching ’ by a stranger was satisfied  and that § 828 therefore 
worked a taking.” 19  Moreover, as a factual m atter, the transm ission of content ove r 
broadband networks is not m erely a metaphysical act.20  It takes place in a real physical 
space, specifically the fiber-optic and copper wires that comprise the broadband network, 
which are them selves mounted in above-g round or underground easem ents across real 
property.  Transmission of internet content primarily involves the movement of electrons, 
which are physical particles, that occupy ri valrous limited space on those fiber-optic and 
copper wires en route from the Internet to the end-user consumer.  While the electrons are 
invisible to the naked eye and travel very quickly within a sheathed wire, the physical act 
                                                 
17 It is no answer to respond that, as long as some bandwidth is available, the broadband provider can make 
use of other network capacity for its own purposes.  “The retention of some access rights by the former 
owner of property does not preclude the finding of a per se taking.”  Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 
1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
18 See Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1285-86 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
19 Id. at 450 (Brennan, J, dissenting). 
20 Cf. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. F.C.C., 819 F. Supp. 32, 64 n.10 (D.D.C. 1993) (Williams., J., 
dissenting) (“The [National Association of Broadcasters] responds that Loretto is limited to ‘physical’ 
occupations of ‘real property.’  But the insertion of local stations' programs into a cable operator's line-up 
presumably is not a metaphysical act, and presumably takes place on real property.”) 
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of transmission is nothing more than a microscopic version of vehicl es traveling along a 
highway—or pedestrians traversing an easement.21 
As the Commission is no doubt a ware, courts have previously entertained the 
notion that Loretto applies to electronic networks.  For example, Judge Stephen Williams 
suggested, in his dissent from  a decision to uphold the 1992 Cabl e Act’s must-carry 
provisions, that a law creating an “entitlement in som e parties to u se the f acilities of 
another” seems to invite a challenge under Loretto.22  In Turner I, four Justices 
recognized that a common carriag e obligation placed on  some of a  cable system ’s 
channels would raise a Takings Clause questions even though the question was not  
squarely presented before that Court. 23  Professor Laurence Tribe built upon these 
discussions in his 2002 comments to the Co mmission, in which he argued that digital  
must-carry rules would effectively condemn a portion of the cable network under Loretto 
by allowing broadcasters the unfettered right to use portions of cable networks.24 
II. DISTINGUISHING COMMON CARRIAGE 
Proponents may argue that the proposed ru les are sim ply a species of comm on 
carriage.  Admittedly, a regulatory takings claim is unlikely to succeed if the restriction 
lies in the background norms that the common l aw would place on pro perty, including 
                                                 
21 Moreover, it is worth noting that several courts have found takings where third-party interference with an 
owner’s property rights falls short of actual placement of physical objects on the owner’s property.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (regular low-level flyovers by military aircraft) (cited as 
example of physical taking in Loretto); Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) (smoke and 
gases from nearby tunnel constructed under act of Congress). 
22 Turner Broadcasting Sys., 819 F. Supp. At 64 n.10 (Williams., J., dissenting) 
23 Turner I, 512 U.S. 622, 684 (1994) (O’Connor, J., joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Congress might also conceivably obligate cable operators to act 
as common carriers for some of their channels, with those channels being open to all through some sort of 
lottery system or time-sharing arrangement.  Setting aside any possible Takings Clause issues, it stands to 
reason that if Congress may demand that telephone companies operate as common carriers, it can ask the 
same of cable companies.”) (emphasis added). 
24 Laurence H. Tribe, Why the Commission Should Not Adopt a Broad View of the “Primary Video” 
Carriage Obligation, Comments filed with Commission July 9, 2002, at 13-14.   
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common carriage restrictions.  In such cas es, the Court has explained, no taking can 
occur because the law has not “taken” anythi ng to which the owner is entitled under the 
common law.25  But to fit this safe harbor, the proposed rules must “do no m ore than 
duplicate the result that c ould have been achieved in the courts” under a comm on law 
property claim, or otherwise m ake explicit a limitation implied in th e owner’s title by 
“existing rules or understandings.” 26   In this ca se, the net ne utrality restrictions go far 
beyond whatever limitations common carriage placed upon network owners at common 
law. 
In NARUC v. FCC , the DC Circuit struggled w ith how to apply the “long and 
complicated history” o f the “common law definition of comm on carrier” to  the 
telecommunications industry.27  As interpr eted by subsequent courts and Comm ission 
decisions, the two-part NARUC test finds a bus iness to be a common carrier “[(1)]  if it  
will ‘make capacity availab le to the public indi fferently’ or [(2)] if ‘the public interes t 
requires common carrier operation of the proposed facility.’” 28  The first prong focuses 
upon whether the business “undert akes to carry for all peop le indiscriminately….  [A] 
carrier will not be a common carrier where its pract ice is to m ake individualized 
decisions, in particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal.”29  The second focuses 
primarily upon market dominance: “In ascertaining the public interest, the focus of our 
inquiry here is whether the license applicant has sufficient m arket power to warrant 
                                                 
25 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028-29 (1992). 
26 Id. at 1029-30. 
27 National Ass’n of Reg. Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (hereafter “NARUC 
I”). 
28 Virgin Islands Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 198 F.3d 921, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting In re Cable & Wireless 
PLC, 12 FCC Rcd. 8516, paras. 14-15 (1997)). 
29 NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 641 (emphasis added). 
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regulatory treatment as a common carrier.”30  This disjunctive test thus captures the broad 
range of industries traditionally considered co mmon carriers: utilities such as electricity 
and traditional telephon y are common carriers by virtue of their m arket power, while 
industries such as trucking and lodging can  become common carriers even without 
market power if they voluntarily hold themselves out to serve the public indiscriminately. 
Broadband providers satisfy neit her prong of the disjunctive NARUC test.  First,  
as regards content and app lication providers, broadband pr oviders explicitly have not 
held themselves out to carry f or all entities indiscriminately.  Rather, they rese rved the 
right to make, and in many cases actually have made, “individual decisions, in particular 
cases, whether and on what term s to deal.”  Moreover, the Comm ission has repeatedly 
found that the m arketplace for b roadband services is competitive,  thus foreclosing a 
finding of market power.  Indeed, this findi ng was central to the Comm ission’s decision 
to classify broadband as a Title I service fr ee of the common carrie r obligations that 
would have come had it instead been classified as a Title II telecommunications service.31  
Because broadband service does not satisfy either prong of the NARUC test, it does not fit 
the traditional common law definition of common carriage. 
Even if broadband providers satisfied the NARUC test, the proposed net neutrality 
regulations would fail because they i mpose a burden on the industry  far greater than 
traditional common carriage would.  Traditiona l common carriage regulations impose, at 
most, rate regulations and nondiscrimination obligations on  broadband providers. The  
                                                 
30 AT&T Submarine Sys., 13 FCC Rcd. 21585 ¶ 9 (1998).  
31 See, e.g., Wireline Broadband Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 14877-78 ¶¶ 44, 47; Triennial Review 
Order, 18 FCC Rcd. at 17141-42, ¶ 272; Verizon Forbearance Petition, 19 FCC Rcd. at 21504 
¶ 19; United Power Line Council’s Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification 
of Broadband over Power Line Internet Access Service As an Information Service, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd. 13281 (2006). 
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essence of common carriage is to  provide service to  all co mers at just and reason able 
rates.32  Under this formula, broadband provid ers would be able to  provide “tiered” 
service to content and application providers fo r a fee, as the U.S. Postal Service does to 
its customers, as long as they offer  similar service tiers at sim ilar rates to sim ilarly-
situated providers.  But the Open Intern et initiative, by cont rast, would ban such 
agreements outright, whether or n ot this service is provide d on a comm on carriage 
basis.33 
III. THE NEED TO AVOID A SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
Broadband providers need not have an airtight Takings Clause claim to impact the 
present proceeding.  The fact that the proposed  rules present a “serious constitutional 
question” suggests that the Co mmission should reconsider its decision to promulgate net 
neutrality restrictions without  a clear m andate from Congress.  As a general m atter, the 
deference normally afforded to ad ministrative action und er Chevron34 is inapp licable 
where the administrative action raises serious constitutional issues.35  The Supreme Court 
has explained that  
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits 
of Congress’[s] power, we expect a clear indication that Congress 
intended that result.  Th is requirement stems from our prudential desire 
not to needlessly reach constitution al issues and our assum ption that 
                                                 
32 See Munn, 94 U.S. at 126-28; see, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202. 
33 See Comments of AT&T Inc. at 131-32.  As AT&T notes, the fact that common law common carriage 
originates in the law of bailments only magnifies broadband providers’ claims: “under the common law, a 
bailee assumes special duties to care for packages that need special care. Here, broadband providers seek 
the right to act as bailees in this respect—to sell special packaging ([Quality of Service] enhancements) to 
merchants (application or content providers) that wish to contract for extra care in the delivery of their 
services to recipients. And the Commission’s proposed line-of-business restriction would paradoxically bar 
them from doing so.”).  Id. at 132. 
34 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
35 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
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Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a 
statute to push the limit of congressional authority.36 
The canon of constitutional avoidance carries particular importance in the context 
of the Takings Clause,  because a successful claim would require the paym ent of just 
compensation and thus would raise separatio n-of-powers concerns.  Congress possesses 
the exclusive power to appropr iate funds from the Treasury.  Without a clear m andate 
from Congress, the Commission may not im pose rules that create a substantial risk of 
takings in an identifiab le class of cases.  As the D.C. Circuit has explained, granting 
“Chevron deference to agency action that crea tes a broad class of takings claims , 
compensable in the Court of Claim s, would a llow agencies to use statutory silence or 
ambiguity to expose the Treasury to liability both massive and unforeseen.”37  Where, as 
here, “administrative interpretation of a statute effects a taking, use of a narrowing 
construction prevents executiv e encroachment on Congress’s exclusive powers to raise 
revenue and to appropriate funds.”38   
At the very least, Loretto presents a “serious constitutional question” for the Open 
Internet initiative.  When coupled with the First Amendment implications of the proposed 
rules discussed by other comm enters, and the D.C. Circuit’s ongoing concern about the 
Commission’s ability to regu late without explicit author ization from Congress, the 
                                                 
36 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S> 159, 
172-73 (2001); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299 (2001) (“[W]hen a particular interpretation of a 
statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that 
result.”). 
37 Bell Atlantic, 24 F.3d at 1445.  The Court has explained that the mere fact that a regulation may “in some 
instances result in the taking of individual pieces of property is no justification for the use of narrowing 
constructions…if compensation will in any event be available in those cases where a taking has occurred.”  
United States v. Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 128 (1985).  But it distinguished cases such as Bell 
Atlantic and the present case, where “there is an identifiable class of cases in which application of a statute 
will necessarily constitute a taking.”  Id. at 128 n.5.  While an idiosyncratic takings claim should not 
undermine an otherwise legitimate regulatory purpose, a meritorious claim by a broad class of claimants 
presents much greater separation-of-powers concerns. 
38 Bell Atlantic, 24 F.3d at 1445. 
   
 
 12
Commission would be better served to seek  explicit Congressional authority before 
carrying the net neutrality project forwar d.  A legislative stam p of approval would 
assuage any separation-of-powers concerns should the government ultimately required to 
pay just compensation for taki ng broadband providers’ property.  Equally importantly, it 
would assuage the D.C. Circuit’s concerns that the Comm ission “act only pursuant to 
authority delegated to [it] by Congress.”  W ithout such authority, the court is likely to 
continue viewing the Comm ission’s efforts with sk epticism, while the s erious 
constitutional question could prove fatal to the initiative on judicial review. 
 
     Respectf ully submitted, 
      ___/s/________________ 
 
26 April 2010     Daniel A. Lyons 
      Boston College Law School 
      885 Centre Street 
      Newton, MA 02459 
